Speculative execution attacks like Spectre can be used to violate confidentiality in all modern general-purpose CPUs. Recently, many compiler-level countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate the impact of Spectre-style attacks. However, the correctness and security of these countermeasures has not been ascertained yet. Even worse, while some of the existing countermeasures seem to be secure, others are known to be insecure and produce vulnerable programs.
Introduction & Outline
Speculative execution is an optimization technique that speeds up computation by predicting the outcome of branching (and other instructions) and continuing the execution based on such predictions. Whenever the processor realises that the prediction is incorrect, it rolls back the effects of the speculatively executed instructions on the CPU architectural state. Side-effects on the so-called microarchitectural state, e.g., cache content, are, however, not rolled back.
As demonstrated by the Spectre attacks [10, 12, 13, 15, 22] , an attacker can exploit microarchitectural side-effects of speculatively executed instructions to violate data confidentiality in all modern general-purpose CPUs. Recently, many software-level countermeasures have been proposed to prevent (or at least mitigate) the impact of speculative execution attacks. For instance, the insertion of speculation barriers [8] , the use of branchless bound checks [21] , the injection of data dependencies [18] , and speculative load hardening [2] could all be used to mitigate speculative execution attacks on branch instructions (the so-called Spectre V1 attacks). Some of these countermeasures have been deployed in major compilers: the Microsoft Visual C++ and the Intel C++ compilers can automatically insert speculation barriers [9, 19] , whereas Clang supports speculative load harderning [2] .
These compiler-level countermeasures, however, are not proven to be secure, and some of them provide no precise security guarantees. For instance, the countermeasure implemented in the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler fails in blocking some speculative leaks [7, 11] .
In this paper we report on our ongoing effort towards formally reasoning about the effectiveness of these countermeasures. For this, we require: (1) a property characterizing security against speculative execution attacks, and (2) a criterion stating that a compiler can preserve such a security property. Concerning point (1), we rely on speculative noninterference [7] , which we present in Section 1.1. Regarding point (2), we rely on the robust compilation criteria by Abate et al. [1] , which we discuss in Section 1.2. We outline our methodology to formally reason about the effectiveness of Spectre countermeasures in Section 1.3. We conclude by presenting a concrete plan for tackling this goal in Section 1.4.
Speculative Non-Interference
Several characterizations of security against speculative execution attacks have been recently proposed [3, 4, 7] . Here we focus on speculative non-interference (SNI) [7] , which compares the leakage of a program under two different semantics: a standard, non-speculative semantics and a speculative semantics. The former is used to capture the intended program behaviour, whereas the latter captures the effects of speculatively executed instructions. Informally, SNI requires that speculatively executed instructions do not leak more information into the microarchitectural state than what is leaked by the standard, non-speculative semantics. To capture this microarchitectural leakage, Guarnieri et al. [7] consider an observer of the program execution that sees traces describing the locations of memory accesses and jump targets.
The SNI framework is parametric in two trace semantics, Sem (P, s) and Spec-Sem (P, s), which yield traces of program counters and memory accesses that result by executing a program P from a state s under the non-speculative and speculative semantics respectively. Formally, a program P satisfies SNI (P ⊢ SNI ) if whenever two configurations produce the same traces under the non-speculative semantics Sem (P, ·), then they also produce the same traces under the speculative semantics Spec-Sem (P, ·), as stated in Definition 1.
Definition 1 is formalized in terms of the semantics Sem (P, s) and Spec-Sem (P, s). For the semantics given in [7] , SNI can be equivalently formulated using only the speculative semantics Spec-Sem (P, s) and a trace projection ·↾ nse that returns the non-speculative projection of a speculative trace [7, Sec. 4 .E]. That is, SNI can be equivalently formulated as:
Before illustrating how (a variation of) SNI can be used as a security foundation for compiler-based Spectre countermeasures (in Section 1.3), we discuss robust compilation.
Robust Hypersafety-Preserving Compilation
Recent work on secure compilation has devised a whole new spectrum of criteria, which we refer to as Robust Compilation (RC) [1] , that preserve classes of hyperproperties (i.e., arbitrary program behaviours [5] ). These criteria are robust, so they talk about compiled code interacting with arbitrary target-level attackers. RC criteria exist for compilers that wish to preserve safety properties, arbitrary properties, 2-hypersafety properties, arbitrary safety properties, arbitrary hyperproperties and many more. Since SNI can be reduced to a non-interference property, and since noninterference is a 2-hypersafety property, we choose the criterion Robust 2-Hypersafety Compilation (R2HSP) for our development (Definition 2 below).
Intuitively, a compiler ( · ) preserves any 2-hypersafety property robustly ( · ⊢ R2HSP), if any two finite traces (or prefixes) m 1 and m 2 generated by the compiled program ( P ) can also be generated by its source counterpart (P). A program generates a prefix if the prefix is in the set of behaviours of the program. Behaviours are calculated only with respect to whole programs, so compiled and source programs are closed respectively with target and source program contexts (respectively C and C). Behaviours are generated according to the semantics of each language (thus their colouring) but they are expressed in a language common to both source and target (thus the black colouring of prefixes). This is a rather common abstraction on program behaviours which does not hamper our reasoning [14] .
Are Spectre Countermeasures Secure?
To lift SNI to the compilation setting, we will adapt the Beh(·) notions from Definition 2 to their counterparts in Definition 1 in a new criterion (SNIP, Definition 3). Concretely, Beh(·) will capture speculative execution (Spec-Sem (·, ·)) according to the language semantics, so compiled programs will be subject to speculation. On the other side, Beh(·) will capture the non-speculative execution (Sem (·, ·) ), so any source program trace will not contain speculation. The two traces m 1 and m 2 will then capture the traces starting from the initial states s 1 and s 2 respectively. In the source, they are generated by applying ·↾ nse to the generated traces, in the target, they are obtained by the semantics. Thus, SNIP effectively lifts SNI to the compilation setting, evaluating the semantics of the program patched with the countermeasure against the non-speculative semantic.
Definition 3 (SNIP, Informally). · ⊢ SNIP : ∀P, C, {m 1 , m 2 }.
Proving a compiler to be SNIP (i.e., our form of R2HSP) means that compiled code behaves as though the speculatively executed instructions do not leak sensitive information no matter what they interact with (∀C). That is, any speculatively executed instruction only reveals information already disclosed under the non-speculative semantics, and as such it does not leak anything via speculative execution attacks.
On the other hand, a compiler violating SNIP will generates code whose speculation behaviour in the target language is not possible in the source (∄C). That behaviour (i.e., that pair of traces) speculatively leaks information that is not leaked under the non-speculative semantics. Thus, a compiler that is not SNIP produces programs that might be vulnerable to Spectre-like attacks.
A final caveat is that we must prevent the actions generated by the context to pop up in the traces. Otherwise, a context could speculate and be subject to Spectre and trivially invalidate our theorem. However, our results only care about compiled code (which contains the Spectre countermeasure), so we are not concerned with violations from the context, thus we will eliminate them.
Proof-wise, to prove a compiler is R2HSP (and also SNIP) we need to create (read, backtranslate, in secure compilation jargon) a source context C starting from either the target context C or the two traces m 1 and m 2 . Depending on the structure and the information carried by the traces, they may be enough to create C, which means we can use a simplified form of so-called trace-based backtranslation [1, 20] . Otherwise, we can use a context-based backtranslation, relying solely on C to build C [1, 6, 17] .
We believe we can show that the aforementioned Microsoft Visual C++ compiler [19] does not attain SNIP, while compilers that (correctly) implement the speculation barriers [2] and speculative load hardening [9] do attain SNIP. These results will confirm that our approach to reason about compilerlevel Spectre countermeasures is correct and it captures the right security intuition.
Implementing This Strategy
We outline our concrete plan for the work we just presented on reasoning about the security of Spectre countermeasures.
1. As explained in Section 1.3, we will start our effort by analyzing the effectiveness of the countermeasures against Spectre V1 attacks, i.e., insertion of speculation barriers [9, 16] and speculative load hardening [2] . This requires formalizing such countermeasures as compilers and proving their correctness as discussed in Section 1.3. We plan to carry out all our proofs in the context of the speculative and nonspeculative semantics of Guarnieri et al. [7] . However, we will lift those results from assembly to while languages for simplicity. 2. Then we plan to focus on compiler-level countermeasures for other Spectre variants (e.g., retpoline for Spectre V2). This will require extending the semantics of Guarnieri et al. [7] with additional features, such as speculation over indirect jumps, and showing that SNIP still captures these attacks. We will also have to prove the correctness of the new countermeasures against these variants. 3. Finally, we want to consider more complex speculative semantics, such as the one of Cauligi et al. [3] and see whether our approach scales to those semantics too.
